Read 2026-11-07
mxcl/promisekit: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in mxcl/promisekit's code and history at 96cd3bd: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | adequate |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | not assessable |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | not assessable |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
.gitmodules:1: 23 submodule(s) this survey does not read: Extensions/Foundation, Extensions/UIKit, Extensions/Accounts
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
adequateNo finding.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateAlmost no process scaffolding exists in the repository
adequateOf five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.
| 1 of 5 markers present across 158 tracked files |
Pinned dependencies have not moved in 57 months
adequateThe lockfile last changed 1715 days before the newest commit, and 84 commits have landed since. Every security fix published upstream in that time is absent until someone updates it, and the longer the gap the larger and riskier that update becomes.
| Tests/JS-A+/package-lock.json last changed 2021-09-22 |
Product & Engineering Maturity
not assessableNot rated: only 8 of 19 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateNone of the standard security guard rails are configured
adequateThere is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.
| checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 158 tracked files; 0 present |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate9 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/cd.yml:13 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/cd.yml:49 — action pinned by tag |
Observability & Operations
not assessableNot rated: only 4 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on mxcl/promisekit: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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