Read 2026-10-04
livebook-dev/livebook: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in livebook-dev/livebook's code and history at 81db338: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | strong |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
- Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
LICENSE: Relicensed: AGPL-3.0 → Apache-2.0 (2021-04-13)
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
stronglib/livebook/session.ex is 3,580 lines, 34× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 103 lines. 9 files exceed 1,030 lines, the largest being 3,580. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
lib/livebook/session.ex:1 — 3,580 lines (34× median) |
lib/livebook/session/data.ex:1 — 3,137 lines (30× median) |
lib/livebook_web/live/session_live.ex:1 — 2,244 lines (21× median) |
assets/js/hooks/session.js:1 — 1,497 lines (14× median) |
lib/livebook_web/live/session_live/render.ex:1 — 1,482 lines (14× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongAlmost no process scaffolding exists in the repository
adequateOf five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.
| 1 of 5 markers present across 712 tracked files |
Product & Engineering Maturity
strongEffort is shifting from building to rewriting
adequateDeleted lines per line added rose from 0.50 to 0.75 between the first and second halves of this history. Rework is normal and often healthy, but a rising ratio means an increasing share of the team's time is spent replacing code that already exists rather than building what does not. Whether that is deliberate repayment or churn is a question for the team.
| first half 0.50, second half 0.75 (split 2023-11-12) |
Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
adequateThe newest release, v0.19.10, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v0.9.2. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.
| tag v0.19.10 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate56 dependencies float, and no lockfile is committed
adequateDependency versions are declared as ranges and no lockfile is committed, so a build today does not necessarily produce what a build last month produced. That matters twice over in a transaction: the thing being bought cannot be reproduced exactly, and a compromised upstream release arrives without anyone choosing to take it.
assets/package.json:11 — ^6.11.1 |
assets/package.json:12 — ^6.3.3 |
assets/package.json:13 — ^6.2.1 |
assets/package.json:14 — ^6.4.7 |
assets/package.json:15 — ^6.2.1 |
3 Dockerfiles run the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
Dockerfile — runs as root |
iframe/Dockerfile — runs as root |
lib/livebook/hubs/dockerfile.ex — runs as root |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate10 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:26 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/ci.yml:118 — action pinned by tag |
38 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 14 high or critical
adequate38 of 656 locked dependencies match 76 published advisories in OSV, 14 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.
iframe/mix.lock — bandit 1.0.0: GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j (high), fixed in 1.11.0 |
mix.lock — mint 1.8.0: GHSA-g586-ccqf-7x4r (high), fixed in 1.9.0 |
mix.lock — phoenix 1.8.7: GHSA-6983-jfq8-485w (high), fixed in 1.8.9 |
Relicensed: AGPL-3.0 → Apache-2.0 (2021-04-13)
adequateThe root licence changed 1 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.
5 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 3 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-08-05. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed commit. GHSA-68c2-prqg-x62g (high) is fixed in the surveyed commit; which release carries it cannot be told from this history, which does not place the release users run. Answer lives in: the version you run.
| 2026-08-05: GHSA-qpjc-w5mm-73mj (moderate), fixed in 0.18.7: Unescaped deployment environment variables in generated setup commands |
| 2026-08-05: GHSA-68c2-prqg-x62g (high), fixed in 0.18.7: JS-view sandboxed output can synthesize keyboard events to trigger unconfirmed global shortcuts (forced full evaluation / runtime restart) |
| 2026-08-05: GHSA-pvvw-28fw-c6fg (moderate), fixed in 0.18.7: Livebook Teams Identity OAuth-style callback has no state/nonce binding, enabling login CSRF |
| 2026-08-05: GHSA-74j5-6grg-g6wj (high), fixed in 0.19.9: Livebook Teams Identity fails open to full unauthenticated access after a deployment group becomes unresolvable in the agent local cache |
| 2026-08-05: GHSA-r4h8-2xpq-v48g (high), fixed in 0.18.7: Path traversal via unsanitized file_entries name on notebook import (arbitrary local file write) |
Observability & Operations
adequateOne request cannot be followed through the logs
adequateNothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.
| no request id, correlation id or tracing found |
No error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on livebook-dev/livebook: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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