Borehole · Project · free tier
linuxfoundation/crowd.dev
Free reading: not for reliance
c7bcd68 · 5,362 commits · 5,334 files
Read 2026-10-28

linuxfoundation/crowd.dev: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in linuxfoundation/crowd.dev's code and history at c7bcd68: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • No release for 35 months while development continues
  • LICENSE: Relicensed: AGPL-3.0 → Apache-2.0 (2022-11-16)
  • AGENTS.md:3: names Linux Foundation
  • CONTRIBUTING.md:191: states a policy on AI-generated contributions

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

services/libs/common/src/constants/disposable-email-domains.ts is 8,011 lines, 160× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 50 lines. 23 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 8,011. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
services/libs/common/src/constants/disposable-email-domains.ts:1 — 8,011 lines (160× median)
backend/src/services/integrationService.ts:1 — 3,502 lines (70× median)
services/apps/data_sink_worker/src/service/activity.service.ts:1 — 2,229 lines (44× median)
backend/src/database/repositories/memberRepository.ts:1 — 2,072 lines (41× median)
backend/src/database/repositories/organizationRepository.ts:1 — 1,833 lines (36× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong

No finding.

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.3

90 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

backend/package.json declares 90 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence
backend/package.json — 90 declared
frontend/package.json — 35 declared
services/apps/packages_worker/package.json — 28 declared
services/apps/git_integration/pyproject.toml — 23 declared
04.19

13% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 907 fixes in the last 24 months, 114 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
114 of 907
04.61

No release for 35 months while development continues

adequate

The last tag, v0.49.0, was cut 1072 days before the survey; the typical gap between releases was 7 days, and 678 commits landed in the last 90 days. Users run the last release, not this code.

Evidence
last tag v0.49.0

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.25

4 environment files are committed

adequate

backend/.env.dist.composed, backend/.env.dist.local, frontend/.env.dist.composed and more are tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.

Evidence
backend/.env.dist.composed — committed environment file
backend/.env.dist.local — committed environment file
frontend/.env.dist.composed — committed environment file
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

6 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/backend-lint.yaml:78 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/pr-title-lint.yml:14 — action pinned by tag
scripts/scaffold/temporal/Dockerfile:4 — download piped into a shell
05.20

20 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

20 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. 4 of them put a value into the string; in the rest, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

Evidence
backend/src/database/repositories/memberOrganizationRepository.ts:60 — SQL built from a string
backend/src/database/repositories/memberRepository.ts:285 — SQL built from a string
backend/src/database/repositories/organizationRepository.ts:528 — SQL built from a string
05.26

82 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 72 high or critical in what ships

adequate

82 of 2,848 locked dependencies match 187 published advisories in OSV, 89 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
services/apps/mailing_list_integration/uv.lock — certifi 2026.6.17: GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 (critical), fixed in 2026.10.18
pnpm-lock.yaml — storybook 10.2.12: GHSA-f2ph-cmg5-wxc8 (critical), fixed in 10.6.2; a development dependency
services/apps/git_integration/uv.lock — dnspython 2.7.0: GHSA-45c3-73f7-pv4m (high), fixed in 2.9.0
05.48

6 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

6 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

Evidence
frontend/src/modules/activity/components/activity-content.vue:55 — HTML from a variable
frontend/src/modules/contributor/components/details/attributes/contributor-attribute-string.vue:4 — HTML from a variable
frontend/src/modules/contributor/components/details/overview/project/contributor-details-projects-affiliation.vue:12 — HTML from a variable
05.60

Relicensed: AGPL-3.0 → Apache-2.0 (2022-11-16)

adequate

The root licence changed 1 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

Evidence
LICENSE — AGPL-3.0 from 2022-08-25
LICENSE — Apache-2.0 from 2022-11-16

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.25

1343 commits in a year, and no release marked

adequate

The service took 1343 commits in the last year with no tag, no release commit and no changelog entry. What is running in production cannot be read from the repository, and a bug report cannot be mapped to a version. Ask how the team knows what is deployed.

Evidence
no tag, release commit or changelog change in 12 months

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on linuxfoundation/crowd.dev: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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