Read 2026-10-23
keephq/keep: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in keephq/keep's code and history at e5cd869: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
LICENSE: Relicensed: GPL-3.0 → MIT (2023-02-15)ee/LICENSE: Part of the code is under a separate licence: ee/
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongkeep/api/core/db.py is 6,006 lines, 95× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 63 lines. 15 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 6,006. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
keep/api/core/db.py:1 — 6,006 lines (95× median) |
keep/providers/grafana_provider/grafana_provider.py:1 — 1,773 lines (28× median) |
keep/providers/datadog_provider/datadog_provider.py:1 — 1,641 lines (26× median) |
keep/cli/cli.py:1 — 1,601 lines (25× median) |
keep/api/routes/alerts.py:1 — 1,518 lines (24× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongNo finding.
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate91 direct dependencies in a single manifest
adequatekeep-ui/package.json declares 91 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.
keep-ui/package.json — 91 declared |
pyproject.toml — 89 declared |
keep/providers/fluxcd_provider/requirements.txt — 2 declared |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateThe build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate15 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/auto-release.yml:45 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/auto-resolve-keep.yml:52 — action pinned by tag |
171 outbound calls can wait forever
adequate171 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.
ee/identitymanager/identity_managers/azuread/azuread_authverifier.py:92 — outbound call without a timeout |
keep/api/core/demo_mode.py:213 — outbound call without a timeout |
keep/api/core/demo_mode.py:227 — outbound call without a timeout |
12 of 94 migrations cannot be rolled back
adequate12 schema migrations (13%) have no working way back: an empty `downgrade`, a `down` that does nothing, or a data migration with no reverse. A bad deploy that includes one is recovered from a backup, not reverted. Ask when a restore was last rehearsed.
keep/api/models/db/migrations/versions/2024-10-29-18-37_991b30bcf0b9.py:58 — migration with no way back |
keep/api/models/db/migrations/versions/2025-01-19-10-44_d359baaf0836.py:20 — migration with no way back |
keep/api/models/db/migrations/versions/2025-02-05-15-46_e343054ae740.py:47 — migration with no way back |
3 shell commands built from strings
adequate3 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.
keep/providers/bash_provider/bash_provider.py:36 — command run through a shell |
keep/providers/bash_provider/bash_provider.py:53 — command run through a shell |
keep/providers/bash_provider/bash_provider.py:104 — command run through a shell |
1 deserialiser that can run code
adequate1 places read data with a deserialiser that executes what it reads (`yaml.load` without a safe loader). That is safe on data the system wrote itself and remote code execution on anything else. Ask where each one's input comes from.
keep/functions/cyaml.py:57 — code-executing deserialiser |
64 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 53 high or critical in what ships
adequate64 of 1,611 locked dependencies match 131 published advisories in OSV, 69 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
poetry.lock — anyio 4.7.0: GHSA-82r6-8w77-94w6 (critical), fixed in 4.14.2 |
poetry.lock — certifi 2024.12.14: GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 (critical), fixed in 2026.10.19 |
poetry.lock — snowflake-connector-python 3.13.1: GHSA-5cc2-282f-jjq2 (critical), fixed in 3.18.1 |
Relicensed: GPL-3.0 → MIT (2023-02-15)
adequateThe root licence changed 1 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.
Part of the code is under a separate licence: ee/
adequateA directory named for a paid edition carries its own licence. That code is usually not open source even where the rest is; what the buyer may do with each part differs.
ee/LICENSE — licence: unrecognised |
1 advisory against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-07-21. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 0.54.3. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 450 records name keep with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2006-6763, CVE-2006-6764, CVE-2008-1635, …).
| 2026-07-21: CVE-2026-65057 (critical): Keep (commit 91c75e0) contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to make the backend issue arbitrary HTTP reques |
Observability & Operations
adequateNo structured logging library is in use
adequateNothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.
| searched 1,835 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched |
23 of 43 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate23 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
docker-compose.yml:6 — image without a version |
proxy/docker-compose-proxy.yml:67 — image without a version |
docker-compose-with-arq.yml:37 — image without a version |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on keephq/keep: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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