Borehole · Project · free tier
iv-org/invidious
Free reading: not for reliance
c882300 · 5,967 commits · 370 files
Read 2026-10-04

iv-org/invidious: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in iv-org/invidious's code and history at c882300: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Posturestrong
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • LICENSE: Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2018-01-28)
  • .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md:3: states a policy on AI-generated contributions
  • .gitmodules:1: 1 submodule(s) this survey does not read: mocks

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

src/invidious/yt_backend/extractors.cr is 1,219 lines, 14× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 82 lines. 1 file exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,219. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
src/invidious/yt_backend/extractors.cr:1 — 1,219 lines (14× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.3

Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

adequate

15 test files against 182 source files (8.2%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Evidence
15 test files / 182 source files

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.5

Effort is shifting from building to rewriting

adequate

Deleted lines per line added rose from 0.49 to 0.77 between the first and second halves of this history. Rework is normal and often healthy, but a rising ratio means an increasing share of the team's time is spent replacing code that already exists rather than building what does not. Whether that is deliberate repayment or churn is a question for the team.

Evidence
first half 0.49, second half 0.77 (split 2022-04-20)
04.19

4% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 81 fixes in the last 24 months, 3 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
3 of 81

Security & Reliability Posture

strong
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

7 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

05.60

Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2018-01-28)

adequate

The root licence changed 1 time(s). The latest terms restrict what users, hosts or a buyer may do in ways the earlier ones did not. Code taken under the old terms stays under them, so both matter in diligence.

Evidence
LICENSE — MIT from 2017-11-23
LICENSE — AGPL-3.0 from 2018-01-28
05.65

2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-06-30. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.

Evidence
2026-06-30: CVE-2026-58447 (high): Invidious through 2.20260626.0, fixed in commit 77ad416, contains a broken object level authorization vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to delet
2026-06-29: CVE-2026-57946 (moderate): Invidious before version 2.20260626.0 contains a broken access control vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to retrieve private playlist contents

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.1

No telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere

adequate

None of 283 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Evidence
searched 283 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched
06.8

One request cannot be followed through the logs

adequate

Nothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.

Evidence
no request id, correlation id or tracing found
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on iv-org/invidious: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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