gotify/server: technical due diligence, read from its repository

6 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

10 of 555 locked dependencies match 30 published advisories in OSV, 18 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. None of the high or critical ones is in what the product ships: 1 apply only under a condition the advisory states, which a lockfile cannot settle. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The newest was published on 2026-09-15. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: its keyword search for 'server' is too broad to read whole (40,455 records); NVD: 923 records name server with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-1999-0070, CVE-1999-0079, CVE-1999-0103, …).

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.