Read 2026-11-03
getprobo/probo: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in getprobo/probo's code and history at 23cd7ae: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
AGENTS.md:20: states a policy on AI-generated contributions.gitmodules:1: 1 submodule(s) this survey does not read: pkg/validator/data/disposable-email-domains
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongpkg/server/api/mcp/v1/schema.resolvers.go is 11,677 lines, 122× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 95 lines. 72 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 11,677. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
pkg/server/api/mcp/v1/schema.resolvers.go:1 — 11,677 lines (122× median) |
pkg/probo/generated_document_service.go:1 — 5,025 lines (52× median) |
pkg/cookiebanner/service.go:1 — 4,685 lines (49× median) |
pkg/probo/document_service.go:1 — 3,754 lines (39× median) |
pkg/automerge/internal/testsupport/reference/wasm/src/lib.rs:1 — 2,586 lines (27× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequate5% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines
adequate331 of 6082 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.
| 331 commits over 2,000 lines |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate15% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 1399 fixes in the last 24 months, 205 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 205 of 1399 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate4 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings
adequateStrings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.
| 2 cited: Slack token, where fakes are usual |
| 2 cited: JWT, where fakes are usual |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate14 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 7 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/automerge-battery.yaml:18 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/make.yaml:167 — action pinned by tag |
cmd/probo-agent/installer/install.sh:13 — download piped into a shell |
2 shell commands built from strings
adequate2 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.
pkg/cmd/auth/login/login.go:558 — command run through a shell |
pkg/cmd/browse/browse.go:112 — command run through a shell |
2 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 1 high or critical
adequate2 of 1,065 locked dependencies match 3 published advisories in OSV, 1 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. None of the high or critical ones is in what the product ships: only the build reaches them: a bundler, a code generator, a build plugin, or a lockfile in a tooling directory.
package-lock.json — zod 3.25.76: GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 (high), fixed in 4.6.6; reached only by the build |
go.mod — golang.org/x/net v0.61.0: GO-2026-6860 (unrated), fixed in 0.62.0 |
1 workload setting give a container the host
adequate1 places in the deployment configuration run a container privileged or in the host's network, process or IPC namespace. A compromise of that container is a compromise of the machine, and most acquirers' security reviews block it. Node agents (network, storage, monitoring) are excluded.
contrib/helm/charts/probo/values.yaml:41 — privileged or host namespace |
7 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it
adequate7 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.
packages/cookie-banner/src/activation.ts:193 — HTML from a variable |
packages/cookie-banner/src/components/settings-link.ts:115 — HTML from a variable |
packages/cookie-banner/src/themed-banner/themed-banner.ts:95 — HTML from a variable |
11 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 3 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-08-18. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 11 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 0.216.1. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.
| 2026-08-18: GHSA-4jp4-hf8m-xxhv (high), fixed in 0.261.1: OAuth2 consent bypass via unverified compliance-portal custom domain |
| 2026-08-18: GHSA-jq76-r8vw-9w36 (moderate), fixed in 0.261.1: IsPublicIP SSRF guard missing IPv6 transition address checks allows agent tool SSRF via NAT64/6to4/Teredo |
| 2026-08-18: GHSA-9fx8-47w4-3vw8 (moderate), fixed in 0.257.0: Stored XSS in the console via unsanitized Markdown (iframe srcdoc) in Organization Context; no CSP on the console app |
| 2026-08-06: GHSA-p6m2-fv55-v5wp (moderate), fixed in 0.250.0: Open redirect bypass via path normalization: ASCII TAB survives path.Clean and collapses to a protocol-relative URL in browsers |
| 2026-08-06: GHSA-r9mf-88r7-g6j9 (high), fixed in 0.234.0: Account takeover via OIDC login: the continue redirect hands the victim's root-session token to any unverified custom domain |
Observability & Operations
adequateReadiness and liveness probes are identical in 3 of 3 workloads
adequateBoth probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.
contrib/helm/charts/probo/templates/chrome.yaml — same probe endpoint twice |
contrib/helm/charts/probo/templates/seaweedfs.yaml — same probe endpoint twice |
contrib/helm/charts/probo/values.yaml — same probe endpoint twice |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on getprobo/probo: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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