Read 2026-10-04
getlago/lago: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in getlago/lago's code and history at 6dcdb62: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | adequate |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
.gitmodules:1: 2 submodule(s) this survey does not read: api, front
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
adequateNo finding.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateNo finding.
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequateChange keeps returning to the same few files
adequateFive files out of 543 absorb 29% of all file-level change. Concentration like this is where debt is usually being serviced rather than repaid: the same code is reopened because it is load-bearing, fragile, or both. A repository cannot tell you which — that is a conversation with the team.
docker-compose.yml — 274 commits touched it |
docker-compose.dev.yml — 107 commits touched it |
README.md — 49 commits touched it |
docker-compose.arm64.yml — 38 commits touched it |
.github/workflows/deploy-preview.yml — 35 commits touched it |
Go 1.25 is past end of life
adequateThe code is pinned to Go 1.25 (end of life 2026-08-11). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2026-08-11. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.
events-processor/Dockerfile — Go 1.25, end of life 2026-08-11 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateNone of the standard security guard rails are configured
adequateThere is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.
| checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 166 tracked files; 0 present |
3 Dockerfiles run the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
connectors/Dockerfile — runs as root |
docker/Dockerfile — runs as root |
events-processor/Dockerfile — runs as root |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate7 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/docker-build-multi-arch.yaml:194 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/docker-build-multi-arch.yaml:198 — action pinned by tag |
docker/Dockerfile:25 — download piped into a shell |
Observability & Operations
adequate1 of 7 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
deploy/docker-compose.production.yml:457 — image without a version |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on getlago/lago: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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