Borehole · Project · free tier
fivetran/great_expectations
Free reading: not for reliance
99f4d0c · 13,879 commits · 3,791 files
Read 2026-10-23

fivetran/great_expectations: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in fivetran/great_expectations's code and history at 99f4d0c: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

great_expectations/expectations/expectation.py is 3,203 lines, 30× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 106 lines. 18 files exceed 1,060 lines, the largest being 3,203. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
great_expectations/expectations/expectation.py:1 — 3,203 lines (30× median)
great_expectations/self_check/util.py:1 — 2,552 lines (24× median)
great_expectations/data_context/data_context/abstract_data_context.py:1 — 2,385 lines (22× median)
great_expectations/datasource/fluent/pandas_datasource.py:1 — 1,898 lines (17× median)
versioneer.py:1 — 1,882 lines (17× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong

No finding.

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.2

4,913 unresolved debt markers, 8.3 per thousand lines

adequate

The codebase carries 4,913 TODO, FIXME, HACK or XXX markers across 588,596 lines. These are the team's own notes about work they knew was unfinished. A high density is not automatically bad — it can mean an honest team — but every one of them is a decision deferred, and after an acquisition they are deferred onto someone who was not in the room.

Evidence
.github/workflows/ci.yml:438 — # TODO: revert the timeout back to 1.5 or lower after resolving arc issues
ci/checks/check_integration_test_gets_run.py:28 — # TODO: Add IntegrationTestFixture for these tests or remove them if no longer needed
ci/constraints-test/pydantic-v1-install.txt:2 — # TODO: update our min version or fix gx for our current min version
ci/user-install-matrix.yml:24 — # TODO: This is turned off since we don't ship the 1.0 prerelease to conda. I've filed a t
ci/user-install-matrix.yml:25 — # TODO: when this is available for conda
04.5

Effort is shifting from building to rewriting

adequate

Deleted lines per line added rose from 0.49 to 0.86 between the first and second halves of this history. Rework is normal and often healthy, but a rising ratio means an increasing share of the team's time is spent replacing code that already exists rather than building what does not. Whether that is deliberate repayment or churn is a question for the team.

Evidence
first half 0.49, second half 0.86 (split 2022-02-13)
04.17

Python 2.7 is past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Python 2.7 (end of life 2020-01-01). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2020-01-01. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

Evidence
assets/docker/linkchecker/Dockerfile — Python 2.7, end of life 2020-01-01
04.38

13 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

13 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Aug 2021. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
assets/docker/linkchecker/Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

6 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/ci.yml:199 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml:208 — action pinned by tag
05.13

4 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

4 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

05.22

2 deserialisers that can run code

adequate

2 places read data with a deserialiser that executes what it reads (`yaml.load` without a safe loader). That is safe on data the system wrote itself and remote code execution on anything else. Ask where each one's input comes from.

Evidence
great_expectations/core/config_provider.py:163 — code-executing deserialiser
great_expectations/data_context/store/inline_store_backend.py:118 — code-executing deserialiser

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
searched 2,780 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched
06.9

An error reporter is installed but never initialised

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.18

1 of 8 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

Evidence
assets/docker/databricks/docker-compose.yml:3 — image without a version

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on fivetran/great_expectations: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

Survey a repository: free on public repositories. Private code is read on your own machine by a collector whose source you can read first.