Read 2026-10-04
exelban/stats: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in exelban/stats's code and history at e42ffdf: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | not assessable |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
LICENSE: Relicensed: GPL-3.0 → MIT (2019-07-02)
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongKit/helpers.swift is 2,573 lines, 12× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 205 lines. 1 file exceed 2,050 lines, the largest being 2,573. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
Kit/helpers.swift:1 — 2,573 lines (12× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateTests cover a thin slice of the codebase
adequate2 test files against 142 source files (1.4%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.
| 2 test files / 142 source files |
Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository
adequateOf five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.
| 1 of 5 markers present across 301 tracked files |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate0% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 166 fixes in the last 24 months, 0 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 0 of 166 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateNone of the standard security guard rails are configured
adequateThere is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.
| checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 301 tracked files; 0 present |
The app allows plain HTTP to any server
adequateThe app's manifest allows unencrypted HTTP app-wide (NSAllowsArbitraryLoads, or cleartext traffic permitted), rather than for named domains. Anything sent over plain HTTP can be read on the network, and enterprise security reviews ask about it. Some apps need it by nature (a podcast or feed reader fetches whatever URL a feed gives), so ask which case this is.
Stats/Supporting Files/Info.plist:31 — cleartext allowed app-wide |
Relicensed: GPL-3.0 → MIT (2019-07-02)
adequateThe root licence changed 1 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.
2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2025-01-17. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 3.0.19. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 90 records name stats with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2005-2484, CVE-2005-4692, CVE-2006-2972, …).
| 2025-01-17: GHSA-qwhf-px96-7f6v (critical), fixed in v2.11.21: Local Privilege Escalation via Exposed XPC Method Due to Client Verification Failure |
| 2025-01-12: CVE-2025-0396 (high): A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in exelban stats up to 2.11.21. This issue affects the function shouldAcceptNewConnection of t |
Observability & Operations
not assessableNot rated: only 4 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on exelban/stats: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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