Borehole · Project · free tier
ever-co/ever-gauzy
Free reading: not for reliance
bbcf1d8 · 30,762 commits · 18,059 files
Read 2026-10-23

ever-co/ever-gauzy: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in ever-co/ever-gauzy's code and history at bbcf1d8: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • LICENSE: Relicensed: AGPL-3.0 → proprietary (2020-10-04) → AGPL-3.0 AND proprietary (2024-04-25) → AGPL-3.0 (2024-04-25)

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

packages/core/src/lib/database/migrations/1725879899378-AlterBaseEntityAddArchivedAtField.ts is 8,246 lines, 164× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 50 lines. 94 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 8,246. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (apps/gauzy-e2e/playwright.config.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

Evidence
apps/gauzy-e2e/playwright.config.ts:78 — test retry
02.24

5% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

207 of 4076 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence
207 commits over 2,000 lines

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.3

165 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

packages/core/package.json declares 165 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence
packages/core/package.json — 165 declared
apps/gauzy/package.json — 143 declared
apps/desktop/src/package.json — 120 declared
apps/server/src/package.json — 118 declared
04.14

2 jobs are each done by more than one library

adequate

Within a single package: HTTP clients: axios, node-fetch, request; dates: date-fns, dayjs, moment. Each duplicate is bundle size, two ways of doing the same thing in one codebase, and two upgrade paths to maintain. It is usually the residue of a migration that stopped halfway.

Evidence
apps/agent/package.json — several libraries per job
apps/agent/src/package.json — several libraries per job
04.36

61 feature flags have been live for over a year

adequate

63 feature flags appear in the history. 1 were removed; 61 are still in the code more than a year after they were added, the oldest since Sep 2024. A flag that stays is a permanent branch, and each one doubles what has to be tested. Ask which are still switched, and who owns retiring them.

Evidence
packages/config/src/environments/environment.ts — flag FEATURE_DASHBOARD since Sep 2024
packages/config/src/environments/environment.ts — flag FEATURE_TIME_TRACKING since Sep 2024
packages/config/src/environments/environment.ts — flag FEATURE_ESTIMATE since Sep 2024
packages/config/src/environments/environment.ts — flag FEATURE_ESTIMATE_RECEIVED since Sep 2024
packages/config/src/environments/environment.ts — flag FEATURE_INVOICE since Sep 2024

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

3 credential-shaped strings committed to the tree

adequate

Matches for Google API key appear in tracked files outside test and fixture paths. They stay in the history even after they leave the tree, so what matters is whether each was rotated. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when. Only Google API keys matched. Those are often public by design, in a browser app's Firebase or Maps configuration; the question is whether each is restricted to the app's domains and APIs.

Evidence
3 cited: Google API key pattern matched
05.25

3 environment files are committed

adequate

.env.compose, .env.demo.compose, .env.docker are tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.

Evidence
.env.compose — committed environment file
.env.demo.compose — committed environment file
.env.docker — committed environment file
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

18 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/agent-demo.yml:139 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/deploy-do-app-platform-demo.yml:37 — action pinned by tag
05.20

18 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

18 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. 3 of them put a value into the string; in the rest, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

05.21

2 shell commands built from strings

adequate

2 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

Evidence
.scripts/postinstall.js:223 — command run through a shell
decorate-angular-cli.js:60 — command run through a shell
05.34

10 of 15 Kubernetes workloads declare no resource limits

adequate

10 workload manifests set no CPU or memory limits. One pod that leaks memory or spins can starve everything else on its node, and the scheduler cannot plan capacity for what it cannot see.

Evidence
.deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.civo.demo.yaml — workload with no limits
.deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.civo.prod.yaml — workload with no limits
.deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.civo.stage.yaml — workload with no limits
05.26

48 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 58 high or critical

adequate

48 of 5,388 locked dependencies match 104 published advisories in OSV, 58 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. None of the high or critical ones is in what the product ships: 1 apply only under a condition the advisory states, which a lockfile cannot settle. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
yarn.lock — minimist 0.0.10: GHSA-xvch-5gv4-984h (critical), fixed in 0.2.4
yarn.lock — tar 6.2.1: GHSA-23hp-3jrh-7fpw (critical), fixed in 7.5.19
yarn.lock — underscore 1.4.4: GHSA-cf4h-3jhx-xvhq (critical), fixed in 1.12.1
05.48

5 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

5 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

05.9

1 vendored component with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

Evidence
vendor/nebular — 4 tracked files, no licence file
05.60

Relicensed: AGPL-3.0 → proprietary (2020-10-04) → AGPL-3.0 AND proprietary (2024-04-25) → AGPL-3.0 (2024-04-25)

adequate

The root licence changed 3 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

Evidence
LICENSE — AGPL-3.0 from 2019-06-02
LICENSE — proprietary from 2020-10-04
LICENSE — AGPL-3.0 AND proprietary from 2024-04-25
LICENSE.md — AGPL-3.0 from 2024-04-25
05.65

35 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 27 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-26. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 111.131.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.

Evidence
2026-09-26: GHSA-28wv-vrxj-rp4q (high), fixed in 111.44.6: Public Invoice Link Accepts Unbound JWTs and Default Signing Keys
2026-09-26: GHSA-48h9-vwf5-h8m7 (high), fixed in 111.44.5: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') and Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere in @gauzy/core
2026-09-26: GHSA-57hw-jqpj-ww97 (moderate), fixed in 111.44.4: Cross-Tenant Global Invoice Number Sequence Leak via Unscoped Highest Query
2026-09-26: GHSA-jh6m-9fxr-rx3c (critical), fixed in 111.44.7: Cross-Tenant Entity Takeover via Primary Key Upsert in TenantAware Update Handlers
2026-09-26: GHSA-7xp5-j564-4752 (moderate), fixed in 111.44.2: CSV formula injection in data export (exported cells are not neutralized)

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
searched 14,962 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched
06.18

29 of 29 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

29 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

06.33

13 of 15 deployments run a single replica

adequate

13 deployments set `replicas: 1`, and nothing (an autoscaler, a disruption budget) adds more. Every deploy and every node drain is downtime, and the availability the buyer inherits has a ceiling.

06.17

The code branches on the environment's name at 68 places

adequate

68 places outside configuration test whether they are running in production or staging. Staging then does not exercise production's code, and each deploy is the first run of those branches. Differences belong in configuration the code reads, not in the code.

Evidence
.scripts/bump-version-electron.js:128 — branch on the environment name
.scripts/bump-version-electron.js:168 — branch on the environment name
.scripts/bump-version-electron.js:197 — branch on the environment name

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

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