Borehole · Project · free tier
effect-ts/effect
Free reading: not for reliance
dc66d90 · 11,960 commits · 2,949 files
Read 2026-10-23

effect-ts/effect: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in effect-ts/effect's code and history at dc66d90: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsnot assessable
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

packages/effect/src/Schema.ts is 18,094 lines, 110× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 164 lines. 64 files exceed 1,640 lines, the largest being 18,094. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
packages/effect/src/Schema.ts:1 — 18,094 lines (110× median)
packages/effect/src/Effect.ts:1 — 15,972 lines (97× median)
packages/ai/anthropic/src/Generated.ts:1 — 12,697 lines (77× median)
packages/effect/src/Stream.ts:1 — 12,285 lines (74× median)
packages/effect/src/Channel.ts:1 — 9,248 lines (56× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong
02.6

Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository

adequate

Of five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.

Evidence
1 of 5 markers present across 2,949 tracked files
02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (packages/platform/node/test/cluster-integration/globalSetup.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong

No finding.

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.2

None of the standard security guard rails are configured

adequate

There is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.

Evidence
checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 2,949 tracked files; 0 present
05.21

6 shell commands built from strings

adequate

6 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

Evidence
packages/sql/sqlite-bun/src/SqliteClient.ts:172 — command run through a shell
packages/sql/sqlite-bun/src/SqliteClient.ts:184 — command run through a shell
packages/sql/sqlite-bun/src/SqliteClient.ts:192 — command run through a shell
05.26

5 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 9 high or critical

adequate

5 of 1,183 locked dependencies match 21 published advisories in OSV, 9 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. None of the high or critical ones is in what the product ships: they are development dependencies.

Evidence
pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.16: GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p (high), fixed in 1.1.19; a development dependency
pnpm-lock.yaml — image-size 1.2.1: GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq (high), fixed in 2.0.3; a development dependency
pnpm-lock.yaml — sharp 0.35.4: GHSA-wq5f-xc86-pv6w (high), fixed in 0.35.5; a development dependency
05.65

1 advisory against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-03-20. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 162 records name effect with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2015-0920, CVE-2015-1384, CVE-2016-15054, …).

Evidence
2026-03-20: GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g (high), fixed in 3.20.0: Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC

Observability & Operations

not assessable

Not rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on effect-ts/effect: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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