Read 2026-11-03
eclipse-zenoh/zenoh: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in eclipse-zenoh/zenoh's code and history at 9c47e3d: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | strong |
| Security & Reliability Posture | not assessable |
| Observability & Operations | not assessable |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
CONTRIBUTING.md:37: names Eclipse Foundation
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongzenoh/src/api/session.rs is 3,764 lines, 19× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 195 lines. 3 files exceed 1,950 lines, the largest being 3,764. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
zenoh/src/api/session.rs:1 — 3,764 lines (19× median) |
commons/zenoh-config/src/lib.rs:1 — 2,150 lines (11× median) |
zenoh-ext/src/advanced_subscriber.rs:1 — 1,954 lines (10× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequate76 tests are switched off
adequate76 skip markers across 14 of 102 test files. Each is a failure somebody chose to stop seeing; the question is whether anyone is tracking them.
commons/zenoh-shm/tests/metadata.rs:162 — skipped test |
commons/zenoh-shm/tests/metadata.rs:168 — skipped test |
commons/zenoh-shm/tests/metadata.rs:177 — skipped test |
Product & Engineering Maturity
strongNo finding.
Security & Reliability Posture
not assessableThe build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate15 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 2 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/eclipse-ipddp.yml:12 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/eclipse-ipddp.yml:19 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/pre-release.yml:44 — download piped into a shell |
13 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 1 high or critical
adequate13 of 560 locked dependencies match 17 published advisories in OSV, 1 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.
Cargo.lock — lz4_flex 0.10.0: GHSA-vvp9-7p8x-rfvv (high), fixed in 0.11.6 |
Cargo.lock — rsa 0.9.10: RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (moderate) |
Cargo.lock — rustls 0.23.45: GHSA-c8m5-c952-6cm4 (moderate), fixed in 0.23.46 |
Observability & Operations
not assessableNot rated: only 4 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on eclipse-zenoh/zenoh: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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