Borehole · Project · free tier
dromara/jpom
Free reading: not for reliance
723b1cc · 6,090 commits · 1,114 files
Read 2026-11-03

dromara/jpom: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in dromara/jpom's code and history at 723b1cc: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenanceadequate
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • README-en.md:533: The project does not take pull requests
  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

adequate
01.3

Commit messages are templated rather than written

adequate

33% of commit subjects are exact repeats of another subject, and subject length varies by only 14.7 characters. A log written by someone explaining their reasoning to a future reader does not look like this. The log is therefore weak evidence of intent, whatever the code is like.

Evidence
441× 'fix'
106× 'update'
42× '⏸ segment(all): pre i18n'
01.6

web-vue/src/pages/dispatch/list.vue is 1,716 lines, 16× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 101 lines. 12 files exceed 1,010 lines, the largest being 1,716. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
web-vue/src/pages/dispatch/list.vue:1 — 1,716 lines (16× median)
web-vue/src/pages/node/search.vue:1 — 1,428 lines (14× median)
web-vue/src/pages/node/node-layout/project/project-file.vue:1 — 1,321 lines (13× median)
web-vue/src/pages/ssh/ssh-file.vue:1 — 1,282 lines (12× median)
web-vue/src/pages/node/list.vue:1 — 1,201 lines (11× median)
01.25

4 base images float: no version, or `latest`

adequate

4 of 8 `FROM` lines in product Dockerfiles name an image without a version, or with `latest`. Each build pulls whatever the registry serves that day, so the image that ships can change without a commit, and last month's build cannot be reproduced. Pin a version, or a digest.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.5

40% of commit subjects say nothing about the change

adequate

2,218 of 5,489 subjects are either under twelve characters or one of the standard placeholders — wip, fix, update. The history is therefore not usable for reconstructing why a decision was taken, which is the main thing an inheriting engineer needs it for. It says nothing about code quality and a great deal about how much context transfers with the asset.

Evidence
2,218/5,489 low-content subjects (40.4%)
'git'
'git'
'启动'
'项目基本结构'
02.6

Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository

adequate

Of five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.

Evidence
1 of 5 markers present across 1,114 tracked files

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.5

Effort is shifting from building to rewriting

adequate

Deleted lines per line added rose from 0.57 to 0.83 between the first and second halves of this history. Rework is normal and often healthy, but a rising ratio means an increasing share of the team's time is spent replacing code that already exists rather than building what does not. Whether that is deliberate repayment or churn is a question for the team.

Evidence
first half 0.57, second half 0.83 (split 2021-11-25)
04.19

10% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 264 fixes in the last 24 months, 27 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
27 of 264
04.38

5 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

5 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Mar 2023. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v2.11.12, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v2.7.3. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag v2.11.12

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

1 credential-shaped string in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
GitHub token, where fakes are usual
05.3

44 dependencies float, and no lockfile is committed

adequate

Dependency versions are declared as ranges and no lockfile is committed, so a build today does not necessarily produce what a build last month produced. That matters twice over in a transaction: the thing being bought cannot be reproduced exactly, and a compromised upstream release arrives without anyone choosing to take it.

05.6

6 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

05.25

4 environment files are committed

adequate

.env, web-vue/.env, web-vue/.env.loc and more are tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.

Evidence
.env — committed environment file
web-vue/.env — committed environment file
web-vue/.env.loc — committed environment file
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

2 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/codecov.yml:23 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/update-jdk.yml:41 — action pinned by tag
script/docker-tls.sh:16 — download piped into a shell
05.20

18 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

18 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

05.48

6 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

6 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

05.10

Licence text does not match a standard licence

adequate

LICENSE exists but its text does not match any standard licence. A bespoke or hand-edited licence is not wrong, but it cannot be cleared by recognising its name: counsel has to read it, and until they do neither side knows precisely what rights transfer with the code.

Evidence
LICENSE:1 — 127 lines, unrecognised
05.65

5 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 4 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-11-02. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 5 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.7.3. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.

Evidence
2026-11-02: CVE-2026-120460 (high): Jpom through 2.11.12 contains a cross-workspace authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated users to manage other workspaces' Docker hosts by s
2026-11-02: CVE-2026-120461 (high): Jpom through 2.11.12 contains a cross-workspace authorization bypass in POST /node/ssh_command/batch that resolves command templates and SSH nodes by ID without
2026-10-31: CVE-2026-120201 (critical): Jpom 2.10.0 through 2.11.12 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to gain super-administrator access by injectin
2026-10-16: CVE-2026-111605 (high): Jpom through 2.11.12 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in SshFileController that allows authenticated workspace users to access SSH hosts belonging
2026-09-15: CVE-2026-91993 (moderate): Jpom through 2.11.12 fails to validate workspace ownership when resolving repositoryId on the /build/branch-list endpoint, allowing authenticated users to acces

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.1

No telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere

adequate

None of 1,015 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Evidence
searched 1,015 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
searched 1,015 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched
06.8

One request cannot be followed through the logs

adequate

Nothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.

Evidence
no request id, correlation id or tracing found
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on dromara/jpom: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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