Read 2026-11-03
defectdojo/django-defectdojo: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in defectdojo/django-defectdojo's code and history at fb92592: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | strong |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
docs/README.md:87: This repository is a mirror; development happens elsewhere
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongdojo/finding/ui/views.py is 3,472 lines, 51× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 67 lines. 27 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 3,472. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
dojo/finding/ui/views.py:1 — 3,472 lines (51× median) |
dojo/db_migrations/0304_archive_columns.py:1 — 3,340 lines (49× median) |
dojo/db_migrations/0001_squashed_0090_index_duplicate_finding.py:1 — 3,244 lines (48× median) |
dojo/utils.py:1 — 2,477 lines (36× median) |
dojo/settings/settings.dist.py:1 — 2,389 lines (35× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongNo finding.
Product & Engineering Maturity
strongNo finding.
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate20 credential-shaped strings committed to the tree
adequateMatches for AWS access key, GitHub token, Google API key, JWT appear in tracked files outside test and fixture paths. They stay in the history even after they leave the tree, so what matters is whether each was rotated. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when. 1 other match set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.
| 5 cited: AWS access key pattern matched |
6 SQL statements built from strings
adequate6 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.
dojo/auditlog/backfill.py:169 — SQL built from a string |
dojo/auditlog/backfill.py:181 — SQL built from a string |
dojo/auditlog/backfill.py:312 — SQL built from a string |
3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 6 high or critical
adequate3 of 401 locked dependencies match 10 published advisories in OSV, 6 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.
components/yarn.lock — @vue/server-renderer 3.5.41: GHSA-g2v6-rqmx-r4w6 (high), fixed in 3.5.42 |
components/yarn.lock — undici 7.29.1: GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx (high), fixed in 7.30.1 |
components/yarn.lock — zod 4.5.4: GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 (high), fixed in 4.6.6 |
2 workload settings give a container the host
adequate2 places in the deployment configuration run a container privileged or in the host's network, process or IPC namespace. A compromise of that container is a compromise of the machine, and most acquirers' security reviews block it. Node agents (network, storage, monitoring) are excluded.
unittests/scans/kubelinter/many.yaml:19 — privileged or host namespace |
unittests/scans/polaris/many.yaml:19 — privileged or host namespace |
2 vendored components with no licence
adequateThird-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.
dojo/static/dojo/js/vendor/alpine.min.js — 1 tracked files, no licence file |
dojo/static/dojo/js/vendor/htmx.min.js — 1 tracked files, no licence file |
74 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 5 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-11-02. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 4 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 3.5.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.
| 2026-11-02: GHSA-xr4w-vf88-w48v (low), fixed in 3.3.300: Risk acceptance page let a removed member delete their own notes in other products |
| 2026-11-02: GHSA-4chj-hx9x-6m59 (moderate), fixed in 3.3.300: Cross-product disclosure of per-location finding counts through the report builder |
| 2026-11-02: GHSA-hprf-883v-c8h8 (low), fixed in 3.4.200: File title check on the API introduced in 3.3.0 revealed whether a file title existed in other organizations |
| 2026-11-02: GHSA-r68c-qm7x-4926 (moderate), fixed in 3.4.100: API token expiry was not enforced on the API introduced in 3.3.0 |
| 2026-10-12: GHSA-r83j-v49f-m87m (moderate), fixed in 3.4.0: User account details were readable through an API read path introduced in 3.3.0 |
Observability & Operations
adequateNo structured logging library is in use
adequateNothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.
| searched 7,468 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched |
One request cannot be followed through the logs
adequateNothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.
| no request id, correlation id or tracing found |
An error reporter is installed but never initialised
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
Schema migrations run every time a container starts
adequateThe start command runs the database migration and then the server, and the deployment runs more than one replica. Replicas race to migrate, a rollback cannot undo the schema, and a failed migration takes the service down with it. A separate job or release step is the usual fix.
run-unittest.sh:62 — migration in the start command |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on defectdojo/django-defectdojo: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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