Read 2026-11-03
crowdsecurity/crowdsec: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in crowdsecurity/crowdsec's code and history at 849c7a2: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | strong |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
.gitmodules:1: 5 submodule(s) this survey does not read: test/lib/bats-core, test/lib/bats-file, test/lib/bats-assert
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongpkg/database/ent/mutation.go is 11,599 lines, 117× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 99 lines. 13 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 11,599. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
pkg/database/ent/mutation.go:1 — 11,599 lines (117× median) |
pkg/appsec/appsec.go:1 — 2,245 lines (22× median) |
pkg/database/ent/client.go:1 — 1,924 lines (19× median) |
pkg/database/ent/alert/where.go:1 — 1,814 lines (18× median) |
pkg/database/ent/machine_create.go:1 — 1,642 lines (16× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongNo finding.
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate101 direct dependencies in a single manifest
adequatego.mod declares 101 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.
go.mod — 101 declared |
API v1 and v2 have been served together for 72 months
adequatev2 first appeared in Nov 2020, and v1 is still in the code 72 months later. Two versions mean two surfaces to secure, document and support. Ask who still calls the old one, and whether retiring it is planned.
pkg/apiserver/controllers/controller.go — v1 since Nov 2020 |
pkg/apiserver/controllers/controller.go — v2 since Nov 2020 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate10 outbound calls can wait forever
adequate10 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.
cmd/crowdsec-cli/clisupport/support.go:123 — outbound call without a timeout |
cmd/crowdsec-cli/clisupport/support.go:399 — outbound call without a timeout |
cmd/crowdsec-cli/core/require/branch.go:29 — outbound call without a timeout |
1 locked dependency has published vulnerabilities, 2 high or critical in what ships
adequate1 of 275 locked dependencies match 6 published advisories in OSV, 2 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
go.mod — github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.0: GHSA-6gcq-wc29-5xf2 (high), fixed in 3.8.1 |
5 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-10-27. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names crowdsec with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2026-61718).
| 2026-10-27: GHSA-g9hc-g4w6-4mfx (low): Hardcoded InsecureSkipVerify disables TLS certificate validation in notification-splunk plugin |
| 2026-08-31: GHSA-rh69-4vqj-9gj8 (moderate), fixed in 1.8.0: Unbounded request-body read in kubernetes-audit acquisition webhook (memory-exhaustion DoS) |
| 2026-08-31: GHSA-g2x2-jgfg-pg7g (moderate), fixed in 1.8.0: HTTP acquisition datasource lacks a decompressed body cap and trusts Content-Length |
| 2026-05-27: GHSA-273h-gvwr-c3qj (moderate), fixed in 1.7.8: CrowdSec LAPI: Denial of Service via Unbounded Gzip Decompression |
| 2026-05-27: GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7 (high), fixed in 1.7.8: CrowdSec AppSec silently drops request body for chunked / HTTP-2 requests |
Observability & Operations
strongNo error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on crowdsecurity/crowdsec: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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