Borehole · Project · free tier
countly/countly-server
Free reading: not for reliance
41e8d57 · 28,155 commits · 4,845 files
Read 2026-10-23

countly/countly-server: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in countly/countly-server's code and history at 41e8d57: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

frontend/express/public/javascripts/countly/countly.device.list.js is 22,918 lines, 231× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 99 lines. 78 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 22,918. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong
02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (.github/scripts/merge-shepherd.test.js). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong
04.5

Effort is shifting from building to rewriting

adequate

Deleted lines per line added rose from 0.42 to 0.78 between the first and second halves of this history. Rework is normal and often healthy, but a rising ratio means an increasing share of the team's time is spent replacing code that already exists rather than building what does not. Whether that is deliberate repayment or churn is a question for the team.

Evidence
first half 0.42, second half 0.78 (split 2019-08-11)
04.38

8 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

8 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Nov 2014. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

Evidence
frontend/express/public/javascripts/dom/dataTables/js/jquery.dataTables.js — deprecated since Nov 2014
plugins/push/api/send/data/content.js — deprecated since Oct 2021
plugins/push/api/send/data/creds.js — deprecated since Oct 2021
plugins/push/api/send/data/filter.js — deprecated since Oct 2021
plugins/push/api/send/data/info.js — deprecated since Oct 2021

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

1 credential-shaped string in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
Google API key, where fakes are usual
05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

3 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 18 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/release_notice.yml:17 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/release_notice.yml:33 — action pinned by tag
bin/countly.install_travis.sh:36 — download piped into a shell
05.34

4 of 4 Kubernetes workloads declare no resource limits

adequate

4 workload manifests set no CPU or memory limits. One pod that leaks memory or spins can starve everything else on its node, and the scheduler cannot plan capacity for what it cannot see.

Evidence
bin/docker/k8s/countly-api.yaml — workload with no limits
bin/docker/k8s/countly-frontend.yaml — workload with no limits
bin/docker/k8s/ingestion/countly-ingestion.yaml — workload with no limits
05.26

6 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 6 high or critical in what ships

adequate

6 of 820 locked dependencies match 8 published advisories in OSV, 6 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
plugins/push/package-lock.json — @fastify/busboy 2.1.1: GHSA-x8mw-p69m-v3mx (high), fixed in 3.2.1
plugins/hooks/package-lock.json — follow-redirects 1.16.0: GHSA-8r9p-f939-6h3c (high), fixed in 1.16.1
api/utils/countly-request/package-lock.json — http-cache-semantics 4.1.1: GHSA-ch52-4w7c-c8xp (high)
05.10

Licence text does not match a standard licence

adequate

LICENSE.md exists but its text does not match any standard licence. A bespoke or hand-edited licence is not wrong, but it cannot be cleared by recognising its name: counsel has to read it, and until they do neither side knows precisely what rights transfer with the code.

Evidence
LICENSE.md:1 — 21 lines, unrecognised
05.65

5 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 5 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-10. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.

Evidence
2026-09-10: CVE-2026-87803 (high): An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in the Countly Server DBViewer due to flawed sub-pipeline detection in the aggregation stage sanitizer. The /o/db a
2026-07-15: GHSA-jqp4-p86c-phxc (high), fixed in 24.05.50: Stored XSS in feedback upload enables app-admin to compromise global admin session context
2026-07-15: GHSA-5pmc-54j6-jcgq (high), fixed in 24.05.50: Path Traversal in delete_import Endpoint Allows Arbitrary File and Directory Deletion
2026-07-15: GHSA-86cv-qwp9-jwp3 (high), fixed in 24.05.50: Unauthenticated Denial of Service (DoS) via Unhandled Stream Exception
2026-07-15: GHSA-fqgp-6rm9-8696 (high), fixed in 24.05.50: Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Public Image and Screenshot Routes Leads to Read Internal Files

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.7

The service logs with print: 284 calls against 0 logger calls

adequate

284 `print` or `console.log` calls in the service's code, and 0 calls through a logger. Printed lines carry no level and no context, cannot be switched off, and are hard to find again in production.

Evidence
Gruntfile.js:363 — print used for logging
Gruntfile.js:469 — print used for logging
Gruntfile.js:483 — print used for logging
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.33

3 of 4 deployments run a single replica

adequate

3 deployments set `replicas: 1`, and nothing (an autoscaler, a disruption budget) adds more. Every deploy and every node drain is downtime, and the availability the buyer inherits has a ceiling.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

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