Borehole · Project · free tier
composiohq/composio
Free reading: not for reliance
6bd0db3 · 5,910 commits · 3,819 files
Read 2026-10-23

composiohq/composio: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in composiohq/composio's code and history at 6bd0db3: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md:28: states a policy on AI-generated contributions
  • .gitmodules:1: 2 submodule(s) this survey does not read: ts/vendor/effect, ts/vendor/clack

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

python/composio/utils/schema_converter.py is 2,921 lines, 36× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 79 lines. 12 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 2,921. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
python/composio/utils/schema_converter.py:1 — 2,921 lines (36× median)
python/composio/core/models/triggers.py:1 — 1,879 lines (23× median)
python/composio/core/models/tool_router.py:1 — 1,578 lines (19× median)
python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session.py:1 — 1,501 lines (19× median)
ts/packages/core/src/types/toolRouter.types.ts:1 — 1,492 lines (18× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.17

CI runs tests that cannot fail the build

adequate

1 test command in CI ends in `|| true` or an equivalent, so the pipeline passes whatever the tests say. A green build then means the tests ran, not that they passed.

Evidence
.github/workflows/dead-code.yml:95 — a test command that cannot fail

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong

No finding.

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

4 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/build-cli-binaries.yml:302 — download piped into a shell
05.26

14 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 7 high or critical in what ships

adequate

14 of 1,205 locked dependencies match 44 published advisories in OSV, 20 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
uv.lock — chromadb 1.1.1: GHSA-36p7-vc44-83pf (critical)
uv.lock — uv 0.11.33: GHSA-hq85-5cpj-mr62 (critical), fixed in 0.13.4
pnpm-lock.yaml — shell-quote 1.10.0: GHSA-pqg4-j6r4-53mv (critical), fixed in 1.11.0; a development dependency
05.65

3 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-07-08. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 2 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 0.11.1. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 6 records name composio with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2024-8952, CVE-2024-8953, CVE-2024-8954, …).

Evidence
2026-07-08: CVE-2026-59807 (high): Composio SDK before 0.2.32-beta.283 contains a path validation bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to read and exfiltrate sensitive files by exploiting a
2025-12-04: GHSA-3mwv-j45g-vp3w (moderate): ComposioHQ has a directory traversal vulnerability
2025-01-08: GHSA-8h93-28hg-fj84 (moderate), fixed in 0.6.9: Composio Command Execution vulnerability

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.35

Sends usage data to telemetry.composio.dev by default

adequate

python/composio/core/models/_telemetry.py sends to telemetry.composio.dev, and ts/packages/cli/src/services/run-helpers-runtime.ts leaves reporting on as shipped. Every installation reports to the vendor unless its operator turns this off. For a buyer running it inside their own product, that is an outbound data flow to a third party: ask what is sent, how often, and whether the buyer's customers were told.

Evidence
python/composio/core/models/_telemetry.py:11 — reports to telemetry.composio.dev
ts/packages/cli/src/services/run-helpers-runtime.ts:519 — the reporting setting is on by default

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on composiohq/composio: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

Survey a repository: free on public repositories. Private code is read on your own machine by a collector whose source you can read first.