Read 2026-11-03
centrifugal/centrifugo: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in centrifugal/centrifugo's code and history at e21aeb5: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | strong |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | strong |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
stronginternal/pgmapbroker/pgmapbroker.go is 2,408 lines, 24× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 98 lines. 5 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 2,408. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
internal/pgmapbroker/pgmapbroker.go:1 — 2,408 lines (24× median) |
internal/client/handler.go:1 — 1,398 lines (14× median) |
internal/api/api.go:1 — 1,373 lines (14× median) |
internal/websocket/conn.go:1 — 1,290 lines (13× median) |
internal/configtypes/types.go:1 — 1,262 lines (12× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongNo finding.
Product & Engineering Maturity
strongNo finding.
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate3 credential-shaped strings committed to the tree
adequateMatches for JWT appear in tracked files outside test and fixture paths. They stay in the history even after they leave the tree, so what matters is whether each was rotated. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when. 2 other matchs set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.
| 3 cited: JWT pattern matched |
1 credential-shaped string exists in the history
adequateMatches for JWT were committed at some point across 1,902 commits examined. Some are still in the working tree. What matters is whether each was rotated after it was committed. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when. 1 other match set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.
| JWT pattern added here |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate4 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/release.yml:101 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/release.yml:109 — action pinned by tag |
33 SQL statements built from strings
adequate33 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.
internal/consuming/postgresql.go:189 — SQL built from a string |
internal/controllers/controller_postgres.go:260 — SQL built from a string |
internal/controllers/controller_postgres.go:265 — SQL built from a string |
11 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 5 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-09-29. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.
| 2026-09-29: GHSA-xcch-wm46-g65g (moderate), fixed in 0.39.3: Deadlock between recovery buffer and hub shard lock lets a client stop a hub shard (denial of service) |
| 2026-08-18: GHSA-98cg-m2cg-6xpr (low), fixed in 0.12.1: Malicious/compromised server crashes any embedding application via malformed Reply frame (centrifugal/centrifuge-go dependency) |
| 2026-08-18: GHSA-4r3x-2rwr-6w65 (critical), fixed in 0.21.0: Unauthenticated remote crash via unbounded length-prefix in protobuf stream decoder (centrifugal/protocol dependency) |
| 2026-08-18: GHSA-8w47-3f5r-h9xm (moderate), fixed in 6.9.2: No rate limiting or lockout on admin password authentication endpoint (POST /admin/auth) |
| 2026-07-13: GHSA-v4h4-9j4c-ghgp (low), fixed in 6.9.1: Administrator tokens are transmitted via URL query parameters, posing a risk of credential leakage |
Observability & Operations
strongNo error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
1 of 7 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
docker-compose.yml:96 — image without a version |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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