Borehole · Project · free tier
calcom/cal.com
Free reading: not for reliance
54343aa · 16,499 commits · 7,702 files
Read 2026-10-04

calcom/cal.com: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in calcom/cal.com's code and history at 54343aa: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsstrong
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • LICENSE: Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2021-09-20) → MIT (2026-04-15)

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

packages/features/watchlist/lib/freeEmailDomainCheck/freeEmailDomains.ts is 4,769 lines, 128× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 37 lines. 26 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 4,769. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong
02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (packages/platform/examples/base/playwright.config.ts); 1 test is individually marked to retry. A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.3

117 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

apps/web/package.json declares 117 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence
apps/web/package.json — 117 declared
apps/api/v2/package.json — 48 declared
packages/ui/package.json — 38 declared
packages/features/package.json — 25 declared
04.17

Node.js 20 is past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Node.js 20 (end of life 2026-04-30). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2026-04-30. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

Evidence
Dockerfile — Node.js 20, end of life 2026-04-30
04.20

Fixes are 70% of recent work, up from 46%

adequate

In the last two quarters 70% of commits were fixes, against 46% in the quarters before. Rising fix work usually means quality debt is coming due, and it takes time that new work would have had.

Evidence
72%, 67%, 44%, 46%, 45%, 46%, 48%, 44%
04.38

8 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

8 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Mar 2022. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

Evidence
packages/lib/constants.ts — deprecated since Mar 2022
packages/types/App.d.ts — deprecated since May 2022
apps/web/lib/QueryCell.tsx — deprecated since Aug 2022
apps/web/components/Loader.tsx — deprecated since Sep 2022
packages/app-store/_components/AppCategoryNavigation.tsx — deprecated since Feb 2023

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

1 credential-shaped string in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
JWT, where fakes are usual
05.6

2 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
Dockerfile — runs as root
apps/api/v2/Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

11 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/changesets.yml:36 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/e2e-api-v2.yml:72 — action pinned by tag
scripts/vercel.sh:7 — download piped into a shell
05.26

75 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 86 high or critical

adequate

75 of 3,815 locked dependencies match 168 published advisories in OSV, 86 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
yarn.lock — next 15.5.15: GHSA-2xp9-vwfh-vxw4 (critical), fixed in 15.5.24
yarn.lock — next 16.2.3: GHSA-2xp9-vwfh-vxw4 (critical), fixed in 16.3.3
yarn.lock — next-auth 4.24.13: GHSA-7rqj-j65f-68wh (critical), fixed in 4.24.15
05.48

13 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

13 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

Evidence
apps/web/app/(use-page-wrapper)/layout.tsx:33 — HTML from a variable
apps/web/app/SpeculationRules.tsx:28 — HTML from a variable
apps/web/components/PageWrapper.tsx:87 — HTML from a variable
05.49

The production build publishes source maps

adequate

The build configuration emits source maps for production, so the original source, with its comments and structure, is downloadable by every visitor. Upload them to an error tracker and keep them off the public server instead.

Evidence
apps/web/next.config.ts:239 — source maps in a production build
05.60

Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2021-09-20) → MIT (2026-04-15)

adequate

The root licence changed 2 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

Evidence
LICENSE — MIT from 2021-03-22
LICENSE — AGPL-3.0 from 2021-09-20
LICENSE — MIT from 2026-04-15
05.65

4 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 4 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-01-13. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 6.2.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: its keyword search for 'cal com' is too broad to read whole (8,357 records).

Evidence
2026-01-13: GHSA-7hg4-x4pr-3hrg (critical), fixed in >= 6.0.7: Authentication Bypass via Unvalidated Email in Custom JWT Callback
2025-12-07: GHSA-qjx2-5xqp-cpf4 (critical), fixed in >= 5.9.9: Cal.com affected by CVE-2025-55182 and CVE-2025-66478
2025-12-03: GHSA-9r3w-4j8q-pw98 (critical), fixed in 5.9.8: Authentication Bypass via bad TOTP + password checks
2024-12-04: GHSA-vgj7-76cw-h6f8 (high): XSS via booking view questions

Observability & Operations

strong
06.18

3 of 3 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

3 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

Evidence
docker-compose.yml:15 — image without a version
docker-compose.yml:28 — image without a version
docker-compose.yml:122 — image without a version

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on calcom/cal.com: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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