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bunkerity/bunkerweb
Free reading: not for reliance
b09e418 · 11,059 commits · 10,326 files
Read 2026-11-03

bunkerity/bunkerweb: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in bunkerity/bunkerweb's code and history at b09e418: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

misc/install-bunkerweb.sh is 9,742 lines, 231× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 42 lines. 22 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 9,742. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
misc/install-bunkerweb.sh:1 — 9,742 lines (231× median)
src/common/db/Database.py:1 — 6,691 lines (159× median)
src/ui/app/static/js/pages/template_edit.js:1 — 5,043 lines (120× median)
src/ui/app/static/js/plugins-settings.js:1 — 4,225 lines (100× median)
src/ui/app/static/js/pages/reports.js:1 — 2,184 lines (52× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.3

Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

adequate

406 test files against 4,529 source files (9.0%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Evidence
406 test files / 4,529 source files
02.24

6% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

183 of 3254 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence
183 commits over 2,000 lines

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.5

Effort is shifting from building to rewriting

adequate

Deleted lines per line added rose from 0.11 to 0.87 between the first and second halves of this history. Rework is normal and often healthy, but a rising ratio means an increasing share of the team's time is spent replacing code that already exists rather than building what does not. Whether that is deliberate repayment or churn is a question for the team.

Evidence
first half 0.11, second half 0.87 (split 2023-03-22)
04.19

3% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 1345 fixes in the last 24 months, 42 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
42 of 1345
04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest pre-release, v1.6.18-rc2, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v1.6.17. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag v1.6.18-rc2

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.6

4 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

2 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
misc/install-bunkerweb.sh:843 — download piped into a shell
05.34

8 of 8 Kubernetes workloads declare no resource limits

adequate

8 workload manifests set no CPU or memory limits. One pod that leaks memory or spins can starve everything else on its node, and the scheduler cannot plan capacity for what it cannot see.

Evidence
misc/integrations/k8s.mariadb.ui.yml — workload with no limits
misc/integrations/k8s.mariadb.yml — workload with no limits
misc/integrations/k8s.mysql.ui.yml — workload with no limits
05.9

13 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

Evidence
src/all-in-one/deps/crowdsec.json — 1 tracked files, no licence file
src/all-in-one/deps/go.json — 1 tracked files, no licence file
src/all-in-one/deps/re2.json — 1 tracked files, no licence file
src/deps/deps.json — 1 tracked files, no licence file
src/deps/init_deps.sh — 1 tracked files, no licence file
src/deps/install.sh — 1 tracked files, no licence file
05.65

16 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 5 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-21. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.

Evidence
2026-09-21: GHSA-xcv3-gjwr-rwxw (high), fixed in 1.1.0: Unauthenticated RCE via the BunkerWeb Worker API in the Official Kubernetes Sidecar Configuration
2026-09-21: GHSA-vqvw-37gh-5w49 (low), fixed in 1.6.15: Cross-Service Custom Configuration Move via Unauthorized Destination
2026-09-21: GHSA-j2mq-vqhg-c5mr (moderate), fixed in 1.6.15: Cache Deletion Crosses the Job-Run Permission Boundary
2026-09-21: GHSA-7w87-8gxh-2x99 (low), fixed in 1.6.15: Service Conversion Permission Bypass in the Fine-Grained API ACL
2026-09-21: GHSA-cvfx-2ffg-cqmj (high), fixed in 1.6.15: Bypass filename rules via `filename*=` parameter

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
C source is not searched: C programs log through printf-style calls unless they take a library, and none of the 10 searched for is referenced
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.18

2 of 10 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

2 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on bunkerity/bunkerweb: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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