Borehole · Project · free tier
bridgecrewio/checkov
Free reading: not for reliance
811d068 · 17,473 commits · 9,863 files
Read 2026-10-23

bridgecrewio/checkov: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in bridgecrewio/checkov's code and history at 811d068: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsstrong
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • .gitmodules:1: 1 submodule(s) this survey does not read: checkov/sast/sast_core

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

checkov/common/checks_infra/resources_types.py is 5,123 lines, 146× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 35 lines. 4 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 5,123. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
checkov/common/checks_infra/resources_types.py:1 — 5,123 lines (146× median)
checkov/github_actions/schemas.py:1 — 3,128 lines (89× median)
checkov/github/schemas/branch.py:1 — 2,686 lines (76× median)
checkov/common/bridgecrew/platform_integration.py:1 — 1,466 lines (41× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong

No finding.

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong

No finding.

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

63 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
5 cited: AWS access key, where fakes are usual
05.6

2 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
Dockerfile — runs as root
kubernetes/Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

4 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/build.yml:412 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/pr-test.yml:10 — action pinned by tag
05.13

3 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

3 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

Evidence
checkov/kubernetes/checks/resource/k8s/CPURequests.py:23 — outbound call without a timeout
checkov/kubernetes/checks/resource/k8s/MemoryRequests.py:23 — outbound call without a timeout
checkov/terraform/checks/resource/kubernetes/MemoryRequests.py:41 — outbound call without a timeout
05.22

3 deserialisers that can run code

adequate

3 places read data with a deserialiser that executes what it reads (pickle, `yaml.load` without a safe loader). That is safe on data the system wrote itself and remote code execution on anything else. Ask where each one's input comes from.

Evidence
checkov/common/util/data_structures_utils.py:101 — code-executing deserialiser
checkov/github_actions/utils.py:49 — code-executing deserialiser
checkov/kubernetes/parser/k8_json.py:32 — code-executing deserialiser
05.26

10 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 16 high or critical in what ships

adequate

10 of 99 locked dependencies match 43 published advisories in OSV, 16 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
Pipfile.lock — certifi 2026.7.22: GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 (critical), fixed in 2026.10.19
Pipfile.lock — aiohttp 3.13.5: GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5 (high), fixed in 3.14.4
Pipfile.lock — ecdsa 0.19.2: GHSA-wj6h-64fc-37mp (high)

Observability & Operations

strong
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.18

1 of 1 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

Evidence
kubernetes/checkov-job.yaml:185 — image without a version

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on bridgecrewio/checkov: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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