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bishopfox/sliver
Free reading: not for reliance
6cf3ad7 · 5,963 commits · 17,149 files
Read 2026-11-03

bishopfox/sliver: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in bishopfox/sliver's code and history at 6cf3ad7: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenanceadequate
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

adequate
01.6

client/command/ai/model.go is 6,316 lines, 67× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 94 lines. 31 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 6,316. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
client/command/ai/model.go:1 — 6,316 lines (67× median)
client/command/generate/generate.go:1 — 2,052 lines (21× median)
server/db/helpers.go:1 — 1,910 lines (20× median)
client/command/crack/top/top.go:1 — 1,719 lines (18× median)
implant/sliver/handlers/handlers.go:1 — 1,646 lines (17× median)
01.25

1 base image floats: no version, or `latest`

adequate

1 of 4 `FROM` lines in product Dockerfiles name an image without a version, or with `latest`. Each build pulls whatever the registry serves that day, so the image that ships can change without a commit, and last month's build cannot be reproduced. Pin a version, or a digest.

Evidence
Dockerfile:13 — base image without a version

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong

No finding.

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.3

83 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

go.mod declares 83 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence
go.mod — 83 declared

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.13

3 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

3 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

Evidence
client/overlord/overlord.go:226 — outbound call without a timeout
client/overlord/overlord.go:244 — outbound call without a timeout
client/version/updates.go:134 — outbound call without a timeout
05.26

3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 2 high or critical

adequate

3 of 320 locked dependencies match 6 published advisories in OSV, 2 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
server/assets/traffic-encoders/hex/Cargo.lock — wee_alloc 0.4.5: GHSA-rc23-xxgq-x27g (critical)
go.mod — github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4: GHSA-mgcc-cww5-fp2q (high), fixed in 4.1.6
go.mod — golang.org/x/crypto v0.55.0: GO-2026-6354 (unrated), fixed in 0.56.0
05.65

12 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-03. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names sliver with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2026-102507).

Evidence
2026-09-03: GHSA-w4h3-gj8x-mqr5 (high), fixed in v1.7.7: Teamserver SSRF via reverse-portfwd allowlist poisoning
2026-07-15: GO-2026-6777 (low), fixed in 1.7.6: Sliver: Unauthenticated Memory Exhaustion Denial of Service in Sliver HTTP(S) Listener PNG Decoder in github.com/bishopfox/sliver
2026-03-30: GHSA-6fpf-248c-m7wm (moderate), fixed in 1.7.4: Sliver One-Click Remote Access: Insecure CORS & Unauthenticated MCP Interface
2026-03-27: GO-2026-4899 (low): Sliver: Nil Pointer Dereference in tunnelCloseHandler causes panic when a reverse tunnel (rportfwd) close is attempted in github.com/bishopfox/sliver
2026-03-16: GO-2026-4723 (low): Sliver Vulnerable to Authenticated OOM via Memory Exhaustion in mTLS/WireGuard Transports in github.com/bishopfox/sliver

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.8

One request cannot be followed through the logs

adequate

Nothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.

Evidence
no request id, correlation id or tracing found
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

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