Read 2026-10-22
aquasecurity/trivy: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in aquasecurity/trivy's code and history at 0231990: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
- Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
LICENSE: Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2019-05-15) → Apache-2.0 (2020-03-13)
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongrpc/cache/service.twirp.go is 1,989 lines, 23× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 83 lines. 9 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,989. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
rpc/cache/service.twirp.go:1 — 1,989 lines (23× median) |
pkg/dependency/parser/nodejs/npm/parse_testcase.go:1 — 1,889 lines (22× median) |
pkg/commands/app.go:1 — 1,523 lines (18× median) |
pkg/rpc/convert.go:1 — 1,423 lines (17× median) |
rpc/scanner/service.twirp.go:1 — 1,143 lines (13× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongNo finding.
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate126 direct dependencies in a single manifest
adequatego.mod declares 126 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.
go.mod — 126 declared |
13 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago
adequate13 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Jun 2021. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.
rpc/common/service.pb.go — deprecated since Jun 2021 |
rpc/scanner/service.pb.go — deprecated since Jun 2021 |
rpc/cache/service.pb.go — deprecated since Jun 2021 |
pkg/flag/db_flags.go — deprecated since Jul 2022 |
pkg/flag/misconf_flags.go — deprecated since Jul 2022 |
Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
adequateThe newest release, v0.76.1, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v0.76.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.
| tag v0.76.1 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate20 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings
adequateStrings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key. 1 other match set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.
| 5 cited: AWS access key, where fakes are usual |
1 Dockerfile runs the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
Dockerfile — runs as root |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate2 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
contrib/Trivy.gitlab-ci.yml:15 — download piped into a shell |
2 outbound calls can wait forever
adequate2 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.
pkg/fanal/analyzer/imgconf/apk/apk.go:111 — outbound call without a timeout |
pkg/vex/sbomref.go:80 — outbound call without a timeout |
2 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 1 high or critical
adequate2 of 470 locked dependencies match 3 published advisories in OSV, 1 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.
1 vendored component with no licence
adequateThird-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.
pkg/fanal/analyzer/language/dotnet/deps/deps.go — 1 tracked files, no licence file |
Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2019-05-15) → Apache-2.0 (2020-03-13)
adequateThe root licence changed 2 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.
7 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 4 high or critical, 1 on CISA's known-exploited list
adequate1 of them is on CISA's known-exploited list: check first whether the release you run has the fix. The newest was published on 2026-10-02. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 3 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 0.76.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.
| 2026-03-21: GO-2026-4919 (critical; on CISA's Known Exploited list): Trivy ecosystem supply chain was briefly compromised in github.com/aquasecurity/trivy |
| 2026-10-02: CVE-2026-104994 (low): Trivy before 0.71.0 allows directory traversal in Terraform filesystem functions when they try to access pathnames above the scan root. The risk occurs when usi |
| 2026-06-30: GHSA-8rc5-4fr6-64pw (moderate), fixed in 0.72.0: Trivy Plugin Manager has Path Traversal that Allows Arbitrary File Write |
| 2026-06-15: GHSA-mcj4-mphf-j9ff (high), fixed in 0.71.1: Trivy has a path traversal via a crafted vulnerability database or other downloaded artifacts |
| 2026-06-04: GHSA-q3fv-x8vg-qqm4 (high), fixed in 0.71.0: Trivy: Helm chart tar bomb causes OOM via unbounded io.ReadAll in parser |
Observability & Operations
adequateNo error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 1 of 1 workloads
adequateBoth probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.
helm/trivy/templates/statefulset.yaml — same probe endpoint twice |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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