Borehole · Project · free tier
aaif-goose/goose
Free reading: not for reliance
c3bfc5f · 5,881 commits · 2,529 files
Read 2026-10-23

aaif-goose/goose: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in aaif-goose/goose's code and history at c3bfc5f: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsstrong
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
  • README.md:29: names Linux Foundation
  • SECURITY.md:13: states a policy on AI-generated contributions

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

crates/goose-provider-types/src/formats/openai.rs is 5,999 lines, 42× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 140 lines. 44 files exceed 1,400 lines, the largest being 5,999. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
crates/goose-provider-types/src/formats/openai.rs:1 — 5,999 lines (42× median)
crates/goose/src/session/session_manager.rs:1 — 5,459 lines (38× median)
crates/goose/src/acp/provider.rs:1 — 4,770 lines (34× median)
crates/goose/src/acp/server.rs:1 — 3,934 lines (28× median)
crates/goose-cli/src/session/mod.rs:1 — 3,408 lines (24× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong

No finding.

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.19

13% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 1811 fixes in the last 24 months, 227 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
227 of 1811
04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v1.56.0, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v1.0.35. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag v1.56.0

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

3 credential-shaped strings committed to the tree

adequate

Matches for private key block appear in tracked files outside test and fixture paths. They stay in the history even after they leave the tree, so what matters is whether each was rotated. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when. 1 other match set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.

Evidence
3 cited: private key block pattern matched
05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
services/ask-ai-bot/Dockerfile — runs as root
05.25

1 environment file is committed

adequate

ui/desktop/.env is tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.

Evidence
ui/desktop/.env — committed environment file
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

3 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/python-sdk-wheels.yml:58 — download piped into a shell
05.26

38 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 11 high or critical in what ships

adequate

38 of 2,594 locked dependencies match 139 published advisories in OSV, 60 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
ui/pnpm-lock.yaml — proxy-addr 2.0.7: GHSA-jqcg-44mw-7w3h (critical), fixed in 2.0.8
ui/pnpm-lock.yaml — tar 6.2.1: GHSA-23hp-3jrh-7fpw (critical), fixed in 7.5.19; a development dependency
ui/pnpm-lock.yaml — body-parser 2.2.2: GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828 (high), fixed in 2.4.0
05.48

12 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

12 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

05.65

3 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-12. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 1.56.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 12 records name goose with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2026-111079, CVE-2026-48503, CVE-2026-48741, …).

Evidence
2026-10-12: CVE-2026-109561 (low): goose from 1.28.0 before 1.44.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows tools to run without user approval in Manual Approval mode because pe
2026-09-04: CVE-2026-85623 (high): goose 1.37.0 executes arbitrary commands from recipe stdio extensions and retry.checks without security inspection. Attackers can distribute malicious recipes t
2026-07-24: GHSA-r5pp-p5r8-466r (high), fixed in 1.44.0: Arbitrary command execution in goose CLI via `goose review` via git core.fsmonitor

Observability & Operations

strong
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on aaif-goose/goose: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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